

# The CTBT and the Ban Treaty

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# Existing Treaties

- NPT does not explicitly address “testing” or “explosions” —bans NNWS from receiving, manufacturing or otherwise acquiring NW
- LTBT/PTBT bans nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater or outer space
- TTBT limits underground nuclear explosions to 150 KT
- CTBT prohibits “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion” —not defined, but clear from negotiating record

# NWS Step-by-Step Approach

- U.S. (Obama) proposal for bilateral 1/3 reductions in SOA below New START; “bold reductions” in tactical nuclear weapons
- Russia: links to ABM, long-range precision conventional weapons, third-country forces; next steps should be multilateral
- Russia/China: Ban weapons in orbit
- Bring CTBT into force
- FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

# NWS Step-by-step Approach

- INF Treaty: Russia correct alleged violation, or allow some INF missiles, or make Treaty multilateral?
- CFE Treaty: NATO ratify Adapted Treaty and Russia resume implementation, or give up on CFE and create new European security framework? Role of OSCE?
- 4 Statesmen: Create “Joint Enterprise”
- Trump administration policies not formed—Nuclear Posture Review underway
- Many ideas and proposals, but near-term prospects not good

# Enter the Ban Treaty

- New research showed effects of even limited nuclear war even worse than previously thought—Nuclear Winter Part II
- Lack of progress on fulfilling NPT Art. VI—perception that step-by-step approach has stalled
- Growing concerns about humanitarian consequences—NGOs very active
- 10 creative steps to a treaty

Oslo 2013



Nayarit, Mexico 2014



Vienna 2014



Austrian Pledge 2014  
Humanitarian Pledge/Initiative 2015



NPT Revcon 2015




# States-Parties to Ban Treaty

- Will almost certainly be only NNWS—also no NATO or umbrella states, at least initially
- Already prohibited from acquiring NW by NPT
- Many also are in Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
- Early entry into force—only 40 states required
- Curious legal situation



# NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE AREAS

Demarcation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear-weapon-free status and nuclear-weapon-free geographical regions



Treaty	Definitions	Elimination Procedures	Elimination Timelines	Verification, including OSI	Implementation Organization
INF	X	X	X	X	X
START	X	X	X	X	X
New START	X	X	X	X	X
CWC	X	X	X	X	X
BWC			X		Geneva Office
CTBT			For Verification	X	X
NPT			For Verification	X	Review Conferences
OTTAWA (LANDMINES)	X		X	Fact-Finding Missions	Review Conferences

# Main Ban Treaty Provisions

- Draft text May 22, 2017; final version expected July 7
- Draft goes far beyond NPT prohibitions: bans “develop,” “produce,” “stockpile,” have “nuclear weapon programme”
- No definitions provided in draft text
- Draft bans “use’ but not “threat of use”
- Draft follows CTBT wording—no obvious conflict

# But Other Possibilities

- Some Ban Treaty advocates have suggested banning “subcritical testing, computer modeling or hydrodynamic trials”
- OEWG proposed banning “testing, including subcritical experiments and supercomputer simulations”
- This is close to Indian and Indonesian positions during CTBT negotiations—rejected by P5
- Very difficult to define and verify such activities
- “Activities not prohibited”
- Stated intent of Ban Treaty advocates is to support and reinforce existing treaties, especially NPT and CTBT
- Actual effect to be determined

# CTBTO Position

- Website: “Nuclear-weapons-related testing which purposely results in no yield is known as sub-critical testing, referring to the absence of a critical mass of fissile material. Such a test is not considered a nuclear test.”

# P5 POSITION

- “The P5 expressed their deep concern with efforts to pursue approaches to nuclear disarmament that disregard the global strategic context. Such efforts will threaten the consensus-based approach that has served for decades to strengthen the NPT regime and enhance the Treaty’s contribution to international security and may negatively affect the prospects for consensus at future NPT Review Conferences.”

--September 15, 2016

# What About Existing Nuclear Weapons?

- Expected later Nuclear Weapons Convention to deal with these
- BT not clear—suggests NWS work out procedures individually with IAEA or just eliminate on their own (South Africa model)
- Multiplicity of elimination and verification regimes would pose huge problems
- Learn from Iraq experience

# Friendly Advice to BT Opponents

- Stop pretending step-by-step process is alive and well and you have “set a course” to zero— not true
- Stop ignoring the will of a majority of states who insist on elimination of nuclear weapons
- Continue and accelerate P5 process
- Reinvigorate work on verification of elimination of nuclear weapons
- Cooperation, not confrontation

# Friendly Advice to BT Supporters

- Stop claiming that “any” use of nuclear weapons will cause nuclear winter and mass starvation—not true
- Stop claiming that banning weapons and then figuring out later how to eliminate them and how to verify that “is how we have always done it” —not true
- Stop saying that anyone who does not support BT is against NPT Art. VI—not true

# More Friendly Advice

- Begin to address how deterrence would operate without nuclear weapons
- Cooperation, not confrontation