M. Hoell¹ , Y. Woo²

¹European Leadership Network
²Hudson Institute

Abstract:

The CTBT's verification provisions- especially the IMS -are unparalleled in arms control agreements. Yet, verification concerns were key in the 1999 US Senate rejection of the CTBT. More generally, the role of effective verification has not been not been sufficiently acknowledged recently. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for example, reduces verification to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, thus taking a step back from the more rigorous Additional Protocol. Similarly, the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty underlines the importance of verification of treaties, with 'disarmament verification' having become a buzzword in the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We argue that the CTBT's contribution to arms control verification should be leveraged not only for strengthening the NPT in trying to work out what verification would look like in a nuclear disarmament context, but also for achieving entry-into-force of the CTBT itself. The nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) demonstrate that the IMS works and that the CTBT is verifiable. Now is the time to highlight the CTBT's unparalleled verification contribution to arms control, its expertise to verify the closure of the DPRK's test site, and to persuade the United States and China that they could strengthen a weakened NPT by showcasing their fidelity to NPT Article 6 through CTBT ratification.